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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
After being charged with trafficking in heroin, possession of methamphetamine with
intent to deliver, and misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia, Margie Mocaby exercised
her constitutional right to a jury trial.

She was found guilty as charged, and received an

aggregate sentence of thirty-one years, with fifteen years fixed.
On appeal, she asserts that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during its
closing arguments by: telling the jury to “do your job” and “return a verdict that speaks the
truth”; shifting the burden of proof to Ms. Mocaby to testify or otherwise offer evidence as to
whose items were found in the house; and, telling the jury it had already concluded the substance
was heroin. Ms. Mocaby also asserts that the district court abused its discretion as her sentences
are excessive given any view of the facts.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
At approximately three o’clock in the afternoon on April 21, 2016, Probation and Parole
Officers conducted a parole address inspection visit at an address identified by Margie Mocaby’s
parole officer as being her residence.1 (Trial Tr., p.148, L.16 – p.149, L.10; R., p.87.) The home
was a trailer Ms. Mocaby was in the process of moving into. (Trial Tr., p.133, L.10 – p.134, L.2;
p.143, Ls.9-13.) Ms. Mocaby and her mother were sitting outside the residence when the
officers arrived. (Trial Tr., p.134, Ls.6-20; p.140, Ls.20-22.) There was a man present, Justin
Navarro, who was in the back yard, watering the grass. (Trial Tr., p.135, Ls.17-24; p.141, L.8 –
p.142, L.1; p.163, Ls.3-8.) The house was relatively empty—it appeared as if someone was just

1

The jury did not hear that Ms. Mocaby was on parole, Ms. Mocaby filed a motion in limine to
exclude references to her status as a parolee which the district court granted. (R., pp.87-88, 130.)
1

moving into the house. (Trial Tr., p.228, Ls.7-11; p.143, Ls.15-24.) As they went through the
house, the officers found multiple items of interest to them which they collected and moved to
the only occupied bedroom, and placed the items on the bed to be photographed.

(Trial

Tr., p.221, L.16 – p.226, L.22.) They located four small bags of a dark brown substance, one bag
of a black substance, two bags of a white crystalized substance, several unused syringes, several
clean metal spoons, a purse containing several hundred dollars, and a digital scale. (Trial
Tr., p.192, L.4 – p.193, L.20; Plaintiff’s Exhibits 1-15.) Officer Harr put all of the items into the
largest purse and took it to the police station with Ms. Mocaby, whom she arrested for possession
of these items. (Trial Tr., p.211, L.6 – p.212, L.3; p.226, L.18 – p.227, L.1.) After Officer Harr
dropped off the items she had collected to Detective Kelly Montoya at the department’s Criminal
Intelligence Division, Ms. Mocaby asked Officer Harr what was the weight of the heroin. (Trial
Tr., p.211, L.15 – p.215, L.1.) Ms. Mocaby was booked into the jail. (Trial Tr., p.219, Ls.3-6.)
After Detective Montoya performed a field test to identify the substances, he combined
the four bags of substances that had tested presumptively positive for heroin into a new, clean
baggie. (Trial Tr., p.270, L.1 – p.273, Ls.15-25.) He also combined the two bags of substances
that tested presumptively positive for methamphetamine together, in one clean baggie. (Trial
Tr., p.273, Ls.10-14.) He sent these baggies and the twisted baggie to the lab for testing. (Trial
Tr., p.272, L.4 – p.274, L.11.)
Ms. Mocaby was charged by Information with trafficking in heroin, possession of a
controlled substance, methamphetamine, with intent to deliver, and misdemeanor possession of
drug paraphernalia. (R., pp.53-54.) Ms. Mocaby was charged by Amended Information with
being a persistent violator of the law, having had two prior felony convictions. (R., pp.79-80.)
A three-day jury trial was held. (See Trial Tr.)
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At trial, Corrina Owsley, a forensic scientist employed by the Idaho State Police Lab,
testified that the three plastic bags she analyzed contained methamphetamine and heroin. (Trial
Tr., p.351, Ls.15-23; p.368, Ls.6-14; p.375, Ls.14-15; p.377, L.22 – p.378, L.4.) Ms. Owsley
testified that the bag with the lighter brown substance that contained heroin weighed 27.67
grams, and the smaller bag with the darker substance that also contained heroin weighed 5.09
grams. (Trial Tr., p.372, Ls.17-22; p.376, Ls.18-21.) Ms. Mocaby did not testify at her trial.
(Trial Tr., p.428, Ls.9-15.)
The jury found Ms. Mocaby guilty as charged. (R., pp.170-171.)
At Ms. Mocaby’s sentencing hearing, the State recommended an aggregate sentence of
thirty-five years, with twenty years fixed.

(4/6/17 Tr., p.4, Ls.13-16.)

The defense

recommended fifteen years fixed. (4/6/17 Tr., p.6, Ls.13-15.)
The district court then sentenced Ms. Mocaby to thirty-one years, with fifteen years fixed
on the trafficking conviction, 15 years fixed on the possession of methamphetamine with intent
to deliver conviction, and one year for the paraphernalia conviction. (4/6/17 Tr., p.7, L.24 – p.8,
L.23; R., pp.191-192.) The sentences were concurrent with each count and concurrent with
Ms. Mocaby’s sentences in Ada County case number CRFE-2010-18043 and Canyon County
Case number CR-2009-4571C. (R., p.192.) A Judgment of Conviction was entered on April 7,
2017. (R., pp.191-196.) On April 19, 2017, Ms. Mocaby filed a Notice of Appeal. 2 (R., pp.197200, 203-208.)

2

Ms. Mocaby filed a timely Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion seeking leniency; however, no new
information was submitted in support of the motion. (Augmentation, pp.1-5.) The district court
denied the motion without a hearing. (Augmentation, pp.9-13.) Ms. Mocaby does not assert that
the district court erred in denying her Rule 35 motion as no new information was presented in
support of the motion for leniency, as required under State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203
(2007).
3

ISSUES
I.

Did the State commit prosecutorial misconduct in closing arguments?

II.

Did the district court abuse its discretion in sentencing Ms. Mocaby to thirty-one years,
with fifteen years fixed, following her convictions for trafficking in heroin, possession of
methamphetamine with intent to deliver, and possession of drug paraphernalia?

4

ARGUMENT
I.
The State Committed Prosecutorial Misconduct In Closing Arguments

A.

Introduction
Ms. Mocaby asserts that her right to a fair trial, guaranteed by the Fifth and the

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Article I, § 13 of the Idaho
Constitution, was violated when the prosecutor, in closing arguments, misrepresented, lowered,
and shifted the State’s burden of proof, all of which deprived her of a fair trial. During his
closing arguments, the prosecutor told the jurors it was “now your turn to do your job as jurors”
and to “return the verdict that speaks the truth. That the defendant is guilty of the charges.”
(Trial Tr., p.524, L.25 – p.525, L.6.) The prosecutor also told the jurors that the defense had not
shown the items in the house belonged to someone else and said, “Who else are we going to pin
it on? . . . Who else is there?” (Trial Tr., p.519, Ls.5-12.) Finally, the prosecutor eliminated its
requirement to prove the identity of the substance by telling the jury, “Corinna Owsley confirms,
presumptively at first, and then confirms, beyond a reasonable doubt, your conclusion that that’s
heroin.” (Trial Tr., p.483, Ls.8-10.) These statements misrepresented, lowered, and shifted the
State’s burden of proof, which requires reversal of Ms. Mocaby’s convictions.

B.

Standard Of Review
A conviction will be set aside for unobjected-to prosecutorial misconduct only if the

misconduct is sufficiently egregious to constitute fundamental error. State v. Parker, 157 Idaho
132, 141 (2014). To prove an error is fundamental, a defendant bears the burden of proving:
(1) the error violated one or more of the defendant’s unwaived constitutional rights; (2) the error

5

is obvious from the existing record; and (3) the error was not harmless. Id.; State v. Perry, 150
Idaho 209, 226 (2010). If a defendant demonstrates one of his unwaived constitutional rights
was plainly violated, this Court applies the harmless error test to determine whether the
defendant has shown there is a reasonable possibility the error affected the outcome of the trial.
Perry, 150 Idaho at 226. If so, the conviction is vacated and the case remanded for a new trial.
Id. at 228.

Ms. Mocaby acknowledges that she did not contemporaneously object to the

prosecutor’s statements and thus the statements must be evaluated as fundamental error.
C.

The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct In Closing Arguments By Misrepresenting,
Lowering, And Shifting The State’s Burden Of Proof
“[I]t [is] the duty of the Government to establish . . . guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt. This notion—basic in our law and rightly one of the boasts of a free society—is a
requirement and a safeguard of due process of law in the historic, procedural content of ‘due
process.’” Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 802-803 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). The
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that, “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. V. Similarly,
the Fourteenth Amendment states, “[n]o state shall … deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law. . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Additionally, the
Idaho Constitution also guarantees that, “[n]o person shall be … deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law.” IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 13. Due process requires criminal
trials to be fundamentally fair. Schwartzmiller v. Winters, 99 Idaho 18, 19 (1978). Prosecutorial
misconduct may so unfairly contaminate the trial as to make the resulting conviction a denial of
due process. Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 765 (1987); State v. Sanchez, 142 Idaho 309, 318
(Ct. App. 2005). In order to constitute a due process violation, the prosecutorial misconduct
must be of sufficient consequence to result in the denial of the defendant’s right to a fair trial.
6

The touchstone of due process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the
fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219
(1982). The aim of due process is not the punishment of society for the misdeeds of the
prosecutor but avoidance of an unfair trial to the accused. Id.
“Prosecutors too often forget that they are a part of the machinery of the court, and that
they occupy an official position, which necessarily leads jurors to give more credence to their
statements, action, and conduct in the course of the trial and in the presence of the jury than they
will give to counsel for the accused.” State v. Irwin, 9 Idaho 35, ___, 71 P. 608, 611 (1903).
The prosecutor’s duty is to see that the defendant has a fair trial by presenting only competent
evidence and should avoid presenting evidence to prejudice the minds of the jury. Id. The
prosecutor must refrain from deceiving the jury by use of inappropriate inferences. Id.
“Where a prosecutor attempts to secure a verdict on any factor other than the law as set
forth in the jury instructions and the evidence admitted at trial, including reasonable inferences
from that evidence, this impacts a defendant’s Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial.”
Perry, 150 Idaho at 227. “Indeed, the prosecutor has a duty to avoid misrepresentation of the
facts and unnecessarily inflammatory tactics.” State v. Moses, 156 Idaho 855, 871 (2014)
(internal punctuation marks omitted). “Appeals to emotion, passion or prejudice of the jury
through use of inflammatory tactics are impermissible.”
(Ct. App. 2008).

State v. Gross, 146 Idaho 15, 20

Misrepresentations or diminishments of the State’s burden to prove the

defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt are impermissible. State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho
758, 769 (1993); State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 86 (Ct. App. 2007).

“It is improper to

misrepresent or mischaracterize the evidence in closing argument.” Moses, 156 Idaho at 871
(quoting State v. Rothwell, 154 Idaho 125, 133 (Ct. App. 2013)). Nor should closing argument

7

include counsel’s personal opinion about the credibility of a witness or the guilt or innocence of
the accused. State v. Garcia, 100 Idaho 108, 110-11 (1979).
1.

The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct By Telling The Jurors To “Do Your Job”
And To “Return A Verdict That Speaks The Truth”

In closing remarks, the prosecutor told the jurors:
Ladies and gentlemen, the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt the
defendant is guilty of all the charges. It’s now your turn to do your job as jurors
in this case and consider this evidence, to deliberate upon it carefully, and return
the verdict that speaks the truth. That the defendant is guilty of the charges.
(Trial Tr., p.524, L.25 – p.525, L.6.)
It is improper for the prosecutor to tell the jurors to do their job and find the defendant
guilty. The prosecutor misstated the State’s burden of proof by telling the jury it was their job to
“return the verdict that speaks the truth” where the State’s burden is to determine whether the
State has proven its allegations against a defendant beyond a reasonable doubt, not to find the
truth or to solve the case. See State v. Lindsay, 326 P.3d 125 (Wash. 2014) (holding that
“[t]elling the jury that its job is to ‘speak the truth,’ or some variation thereof, misstates the
burden of proof and is improper”); see also People v. Jackson, 571 N.Y.S.2d 721, 724 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1991) (holding the instruction to the jury that a trial is “the search for the truth” is a
remark which has repeatedly been disapproved by appellate courts).
“The prosecutor was also in error to try to exhort the jury to ‘do its job’; that kind of
pressure, whether by the prosecutor or defense counsel, has no place in the administration of
criminal justice, see, e.g., ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, 3-5.8(c) and 4-7.8(c).” United
States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 18, n.15 (1985) (holding remark was error but, given the context of
the prosecutor’s remarks, defense counsel’s arguments, and the fact that the jury acquitted the
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defendant of the most serious charge he faced, the Court held that the remarks did not undermine
the jury’s ability to view the evidence independently and fairly).
The prosecutor committed misconduct by exhorting the jury to “do its job” and to “return
the verdict that speaks the truth.” Such misconduct violated Ms. Mocaby’s right to a fair trial.

2.

The Prosecutor Impermissibly Commented On Ms. Mocaby’s Failure To Testify
And Shifted Its Burden Of Proof To Ms. Mocaby By Telling The Jury That The
Defense Had Not Offered Anyone Else To Pin It On

The prosecutor told the jurors that the defense “want[s] you to assume that all of this stuff
in the house must have come from somewhere else. It’s not Margie Mocaby’s. We don’t know
who.” (Trial Tr., p.515, L.24 – p.516, L.2.) “Who else are we going to pin it on? . . . Who else
is there?” (Trial Tr., p.519, Ls.5-12.)
In describing what the evidence showed—that the officers saw Ms. Mocaby outside her
residence, then they went inside—the prosecutor told the jurors “They find all of these things
that lead a person to a reasonable conclusion.

If you were walking into that, that’s the

conclusion that you would reasonably draw.” (Trial Tr., p.475, Ls.22-25.) The prosecutor
further explained, “. . . and there’s really nothing in that room where all of the evidence -- where
that heroin right there below the purse was found that suggests that purse belongs to anybody
else other than the defendant, Margie Mocaby.” (Trial Tr., p.476, Ls.4-9.)
However, the defendant has no such obligation—the fact that she fails, declines or even
refuses to suggest the party who might reasonably be considered guilty, does not by the process
of exclusion point to his guilt. See State v. Netherton, 279 P. 19, 23 (Kan. 1929) (holding
improper a “who else” exclusion argument which called for the defendant to clear himself by
outing another on whom the guilt could be placed). Further, such an argument implicates the
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination as it is an indirect comment on Ms. Mocaby’s
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failure to testify at trial. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965) (holding no negative
inference from defendant's failure to testify is permitted); see also; Holloman v. State, 573 So.2d
134 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (holding prosecutor’s argument attacking defendant’s failure to
testify was not harmless error, where prosecutor argued that there was no other female in the
house when it was searched but the voice on the tape selling the cocaine was a woman’s voice
and nothing refuted it—“no rebuttal, no evidence from that stand to say other than it was the
defendant on that tape, or to establish that there was someone, some other female living in that
house.”)
The prosecutor was impermissibly pushing its burden onto Ms. Mocaby to offer some
evidence that the items found in the house did not belong to her. The prosecutor essentially told
the jury that, due to the absence of other evidence or evidence to the contrary, it had proved
possession beyond a reasonable doubt.

This was improper closing argument because it

impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to the defense to produce evidence that the items were
not Ms. Mocaby’s, and such an argument necessarily implicated Ms. Mocaby’s Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination; her right not to testify at her trial.

3.

The Prosecutor Reduced The State’s Burden Of Proof By Telling The Jury That It
Had Concluded That The Substance Was Heroin

Ms. Mocaby was charged with trafficking in heroin under I.C. § 37-2732B(a)(6), which
defines the offense as “did knowingly possess twenty-eight (28) grams or more of Heroin, a
Schedule I controlled substance, or any salt, isomer, salt of an isomer thereof, or of any mixture
or substance containing a detectable amount of such substance.” (R., pp.53-54.)
This offense requires the State to prove:
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Trafficking in Heroin in Count I, the
state must prove each of the following:

10

1. On or about April 21, 2016
2. in the state of Idaho
3. the defendant Margie Lorraine Mocaby possessed any amount of heroin,
4. the defendant knew it was heroin, and
5. possessed at least 28 grams of heroin or any mixture or substance with a
detectable amount of heroin.
(R., p.160.) The prosecutor told the jury, “Corinna Owsley confirms . . . beyond a reasonable
doubt, your conclusion that that’s heroin.” (Trial Tr. p.483, Ls.8-10.) As such, the prosecutor
essentially told the jury that it had concluded the substance was heroin beyond a reasonable
doubt, thereby removing the jury’s need to make any determination regarding the identity of the
substance.
The prosecutor went on:
And so you know beyond a reasonable doubt that Margie Lorraine Mocaby on or
about April 21st, 2016, in the state of Idaho, knowingly possessed in excess, in
fact, at least what was in excess of 28 grams of heroin and she knew it.
That means, as you’re instructed, that each of the above has been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt, you must find the defendant guilty. You’re instructed you must
find her guilty. All of those have been proven.
(Trial Tr., p.484, Ls.14-23.)
Where the State was required to prove the substance was heroin, the identity of the
substance was an essential element of the offense. However, the prosecutor eliminated its
requirement to prove the identity of the substance by telling the jury, “Corinna Owsley confirms,
presumptively at first, and then confirms, beyond a reasonable doubt, your conclusion that that’s
heroin.” (Trial Tr., p.483, Ls.8-10.) The prosecutor improperly told the jury it had proven its
case and thus the jury was required to find Ms. Mocaby guilty.
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4.

The Prosecutor’s Misconduct Constitutes Fundamental Error Requiring This
Court To Vacate Ms. Mocaby’s Conviction

Ms. Mocaby did not object to the prosecutor’s improper arguments; however, she asserts
that the prosecutor’s arguments amount to fundamental error necessitating this Court to vacate
her conviction. “Where prosecutorial misconduct was not objected to at trial, Idaho appellate
courts may only order a reversal when the defendant demonstrates that the violation in question
qualifies as fundamental error[.]” Perry, 150 Idaho at 227. “Such review includes a three-prong
inquiry wherein the defendant bears the burden of persuading the appellate court that the alleged
error: (1) violates one or more of the defendant’s unwaived constitutional rights; (2) plainly
exists (without the need for any additional information not contained in the appellate record,
including information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not
harmless.” Id. at 228.

a.

By Telling The Jurors That They Must Do Their Job And Return A
Verdict That Speaks The Truth, By Implicitly Commenting On
Ms. Mocaby’s Decision Not To Testify, And By Repeatedly Lowering,
Misstating, And Shifting The State’s Burden Of Proof, The Prosecutor
Violated Ms. Mocaby’s Fourteenth Amendment Right To A Fair Trial

The United States Supreme Court has explicitly held that “the Due Process Clause
protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every
fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,
364 (1970). “Where a prosecutor attempts to secure a verdict on any factor other than the law as
set forth in the jury instructions and the evidence admitted during trial, including reasonable
inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, this impacts a defendant’s Fourteenth
Amendment right to a fair trial.” Perry, 150 Idaho at 227.
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“[P]rosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments will constitute fundamental error
only if the comments were so egregious or inflammatory that any consequent prejudice could not
have been remedied by a ruling from the trial court informing the jury that the comments should
be disregarded.” State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 280 (2003) (alteration in original) (quoting
State v. Cortez, 135 Idaho 561, 565 (Ct. App. 2001)); State v. Parker, 157 Idaho 132, 146 (2014)
(holding that prosecutorial misconduct was not fundamental error where improper statements
about nightmares or child suffering were not made or dwelled upon in support of a harsher
punishment and did not misrepresent the evidence that was presented to the jury.) “It follows
that a misstatement to a jury of the State’s burden rises to the level of fundamental error because
it goes to the foundation of the case and would take away from a defendant a right essential to
his or her defense.”

State v. Erickson, 148 Idaho 679, 685 (Ct. App. 2010) (holding the

prosecutor’s distortion of the State’s burden of proof in closing argument was fundamental error
and highly prejudicial).
The prosecutor committed misconduct by exhorting the jury to “do its job” and to “return
the verdict that speaks the truth.” (Trial Tr., p.524, L.25 – p.525, L.6.) Such misconduct
pressured the jury, but it also lowered the State’s burden of proof and violated Ms. Mocaby’s
right to a fair trial.
In arguing “who else,” the prosecutor was impermissibly pushing its burden onto
Ms. Mocaby to offer some evidence that those were not her items found in the house. The
prosecutor essentially told the jury that, due to the absence of other evidence or evidence to the
contrary, it had proved possession beyond a reasonable doubt, which was improper closing
argument because it impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to the defense to produce
evidence that they were not Ms. Mocaby’s items, and such an argument necessarily implicated
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Ms. Mocaby’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination—her right not to testify at her
trial. In so doing, the prosecution deprived Ms. Mocaby of a right essential to her defense which
goes to the foundation of the case. This was fundamental error. See Erickson, 148 Idaho at 685.
In order to find Ms. Mocaby guilty of trafficking by possession of 28 grams or more of
heroin, the jury had to find the State proved that Ms. Mocaby possessed heroin. (R., p.54.) The
prosecutor told the jury it had proven its case and the jury had concluded that Ms. Mocaby was
guilty. (Trial Tr., p.483, Ls.8-10.) The prosecutor misstated the burden of proof by telling the
jury that it had concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the substance was heroin. The
prosecutor’s misconduct violated Ms. Mocaby’s unwaived constitutional due process right to a
fair trial.

b.

The Prosecutorial Misconduct Is Plain On Its Face

The prosecutorial misconduct in this case is plain on its face, and there is no reason to
believe that Ms. Mocaby’s counsel was “sandbagging” the district court by failing to object to
the prosecutor repeatedly misstating, lowering, and shifting its burden of proof. There is simply
no strategic advantage that can possibly be gained by failing to object to, and to ask the court to
correct, the prosecutor’s statements putting pressure on the jurors and misstating, lowering, or
shifting the State’s burden of proof. Further, no advantage is ascertainable by allowing the jury
to be told that it had concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the substance was heroin, before
it had been sent out to deliberate. Therefore, the prosecutorial misconduct is plain on its face.
c.

The Prosecutorial Misconduct Is Not Harmless

Because Ms. Mocaby did not object to the prosecutorial misconduct during trial, she
bears “the burden of proving there is a reasonable possibility that the error affected the outcome
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of the trial.” Perry, 150 Idaho at 226. Ms. Mocaby asserts that there is a reasonable possibility
that the prosecutorial misconduct affected the outcome of her trial.
Whether Ms. Mocaby knowingly possessed over 28 grams of heroin was the central issue
for the jury to decide. It is quite possible that the jurors relied on the prosecutor’s implication
that Ms. Mocaby must identify someone else to “pin it on” (Trial Tr., p.519, Ls.5-12); that
Ms. Mocaby was required to testify to identify someone else as the true owner of the items in
order to dispute the prosecutor’s assertion that Ms. Mocaby possessed the items found in the
house. It is quite possible, even likely, that the jurors believed the prosecutor’s statement that the
jury had concluded beyond a reasonable doubt the identity of the substance as heroin. (Trial
Tr. p.483, Ls.8-10.) The statement was made after the jurors heard testimony from a State’s
witnesses that four baggies were combined together after only a field test.3 (Trial Tr., p.273,
Ls.10-25.) Further, the jurors may have felt pressure to “do your job” and “return a verdict that
speaks the truth.” (Trial Tr., p.524, L.25 – p.525, L.6.) In sum, there is a reasonable possibility
that the jurors took the prosecutor’s statement that the jury had already concluded beyond a
reasonable doubt that the substance was heroin, and believed that they did not need to consider
further whether the State had proved that the baggie containing the combined four bags of
substance contained heroin. There is a reasonable possibility that, had they required the State to
carry its burden to prove the substance was heroin, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.
The prosecutorial misconduct in this case was not harmless. The prosecutor’s comments
misstated, lowered, or shifted the State’s burden of proof entirely, and, where the State’s case

3

Detective Montoya performed a field test on the substances, but Ms. Owsley testified that the
tests performed by officers in the field were not always reliable. (Trial Tr., p.267, Ls.15-17.)
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was weak and plagued by chain of custody and law enforcement’s evidence gathering issues
(see, i.e., Detective Montoya’s testimony that he combined the substances that all appeared to be
the same into one baggie before sending it to the laboratory for testing (Trial Tr., p.273, Ls.1025); law enforcement’s failure to interview either of the other two persons at the residence at the
time of the search (Trial Tr., p.163, L.12 – p.164, L.7; p.179, Ls.7-9)) the prosecutor’s improper
argument impacted the verdict. The Court should find that the misconduct denied Ms. Mocaby
her right to a fair trial because it cannot say, beyond a reasonable doubt, that misconduct did not
contribute to the verdict. In reviewing the trial as a whole, the prosecutor’s improper comments
and arguments, constituting misconduct, likely influenced the jury.

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of Thirty-One
Years, With Fifteen Years Fixed, Upon Ms. Mocaby Following Her Trafficking Conviction
Ms. Mocaby asserts that, given any view of the facts, her unified sentence of thirty-one
years, with fifteen years fixed, is excessive. Ms. Mocaby was sentenced to the mandatory
minimum fixed period of time for possession of 28 grams or more of heroin pursuant to
I.C. § 37-2732B(6)(C), but asserts that the district court erred in sentencing her to sixteen years,
indeterminate. Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively
harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record giving
consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the
public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, “‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an
appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing
the sentence.’” State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho
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573, 577 (1979)). Ms. Mocaby does not allege that her sentence exceeds the statutory maximum.
Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of discretion, Ms. Mocaby must show that in light of the
governing criteria, the sentences were excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. The
governing criteria or objectives of criminal punishment are:

(1) protection of society; (2)

deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4)
punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id.
In light of the mitigating factors present in this case, the indeterminate portion of
Ms. Mocaby’s sentence is excessive considering any view of the facts.
Ms. Mocaby was only 35 years-old at the time of this incident, but she has long struggled
with an addiction to methamphetamine and heroin.

(Presentence Investigation Report

(hereinafter, PSI), pp.5, 31.) She first used methamphetamine at age 14. (PSI, p.133.) She sells
drugs to support her habit. (PSI, pp.34, 42.) Ms. Mocaby realizes she is an addict but knows she
needs treatment. (PSI, pp.5, 41-42.)
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that substance abuse should be considered as a
mitigating factor by the district court when that court imposes sentence. State v. Nice, 103 Idaho
89 (1982). In Nice, the Idaho Supreme Court reduced a sentence based on Nice’s lack of prior
record and the fact that “the trial court did not give proper consideration of the defendant’s
alcoholic problem, the part it played in causing defendant to commit the crime and the suggested
alternatives for treating the problem.” Id. at 91. Additionally, the Idaho Supreme Court has
ruled that ingestion of drugs and alcohol resulting in impaired capacity to appreciate the
criminality of conduct, could be a mitigating circumstance. State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 414
(1981).
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Ms. Mocaby does have a supportive family to assist her in her rehabilitation. She has a
mother who supports her, and who wants her to receive help for her drug addiction and mental
health condition. (PSI, pp.14, 38.) See State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594-595 (1982)
(reducing sentence of defendant who had the support of his family and employer in his
rehabilitation efforts).
Ms. Mocaby had a difficult childhood. (PSI, p.15.) Although Ms. Mocaby did attend the
eighth and tenth grades for a time, the last grade she completed was fifth grade. (PSI, p.40.) As
a result, she can “barely” read and write. (PSI, p.40.) Ms. Mocaby has also suffered from
learning disabilities since she was shot in the head at age fourteen. (PSI, p.40.) Ms. Mocaby has
difficulty finding employment and was diagnosed with bipolar disorder and ADHD. (PSI, pp.15,
40.)
Based upon the above mitigating factors, Ms. Mocaby asserts that the district court
abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence upon her. She asserts that had the
district court properly considered her family support and substance abuse/addiction it would have
imposed a less severe sentence.

CONCLUSION
Ms. Mocaby respectfully requests that this Court vacated her judgment of conviction and
remand this case to the district court for further proceedings. Alternatively, Ms. Mocaby asks
this Court to vacate the judgment of conviction and remand this case for a new sentencing
hearing.
DATED this 27th day of December, 2017.
__________/s/_______________
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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